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Abstract—Ad hoc networks are distributed, self-organized
wireless networks. By their nature, it is easy for a malicious user
to enter this kind of networks with the intention of disturbing the
way they are behaving by not participating to the network. This
kind of behavior is a form of selfishness where nodes want to
save their energy by not routing packets. Many solutions based on
virtual currency mechanisms or on reputation mechanisms have
been shown to increase the networks reliability for this kind of
problems. We advocate in this paper that this issue can be treated
with local algorithms that have minor drawbacks compared to
sophisticated solutions developed in other works. We conduct an
evaluation of our solution, which shows satisfying enough results
to be used in civilian spontaneous networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile
hosts forming a spontaneous network without the aid of any
fixed infrastructure. They have potential application in civilian
and military environments such as disaster relief, conference,
wireless office, and battlefields. Ad hoc sensor networks for
monitoring environment are also being deployed.
Most protocols developed for ad hoc networks usually
consider that nodes are cooperative. Indeed, in military or
emergency applications such collaboration can be assumed.
However, ad hoc networks also have a great potential in civil-
ian applications (for extending wireless Internet connectivity
for example) where many nodes typically do not belong to
a common authority. In such context, malicious nodes could
try to cheat in their interaction with peers on network to save
their own energy. For instance, cheating may happen by not
forwarding routed packets. This kind of cheating has been
shown to greatly impact on network performance. Indeed, in
[1], Marti et al. show that 10 to 40% of misbehaving nodes
cause 16 to 32% of degradation of the average throughput of
the network. In this context, a significant amount of works
have developed solutions to enforce node cooperation. Most
of these solutions achieve significant improvement of network
throughput but at considerable costs. The goal of this paper
is to develop a local algorithm that improves the throughput
of the network and force nodes to cooperate with minimal
overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the context of our work and summarizes and discusses
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the related works. Section III presents our local algorithm that
increases the throughput of cooperating nodes and decreases
the throughput of non-cooperating nodes in an ad hoc network.
Section IV presents the evaluation of the proposed algorithm.
Section V discusses the results of our experiments and propose
an improvement of the evaluation. Section VI makes conclud-
ing remarks.
II. CONTEXT
There are several algorithms suggested in the literature to
prevent node selfishness, mostly based on reputation mecha-
nisms and virtual currency mechanisms. Usually, the under-
lying idea is either to reward cooperating nodes or to punish
misbehaving nodes.
In this section, we present an overview of some of the well-
known proposals in this area.
A. Effects of misbehaving nodes on network throughput
The first work to point out network service degradation
caused by misbehaving nodes is [1]. This paper proposes a
solution that combines two algorithms to counter the presence
of malicious nodes. The watchdog algorithm detects locally
malicious nodes and propagates the information. The Pathrater
algorithm (an extension of DSR) uses this information to find
routes that avoid malicious nodes. The watchdog algorithm is
mainly a monitoring algorithm in which each node monitors
its neighbors:
• each node has a fault counter for each of its neighbors,
• when a node forwards a packet, it starts a timer,
• if the node does not overhear the re-transmission of the
packet after the timeout, the fault counter of the neighbor
that was supposed to forward the packet is increased,
• when the fault counter of a neighbor is greater than a
threshold, the neighbor is flagged as ”malicious” and the
source of the packet is notified accordingly.
As the watchdog monitors its neighbors, it needs to know
the path of a packet: this fits well protocols using DSR. Then,
the pathrater algorithm is used to find the “best” route based
on the behavior of intermediate nodes: each node runs the
pathrater algorithm and maintains a rating for every other node
it knows (depending on their behavior in the past). Then, when
several routes are available to the same destination, the source
node is able to choose the one with the best rate.
This approach is general enough and addresses several
possible malicious behaviors of nodes, however the results
reported in the paper only cover malicious nodes which goal
is to disturb the network. Malicious nodes are nodes that
participate in the route discovery but drop all data packets.
Results show a throughput (fraction of generated data packets
that are received), which is maintained at a value around
80% even with 40% of misbehaving nodes (the simulations
consider 50 nodes). The watchdog approach increases the
throughput of the network up to 27% with less than 10%
of additional network overhead (6% for 40% of misbehaving
nodes and a random waypoint model movement scenario with
60 second pause time). The problem with this approach is
that its primary goal is to increase network throughput, not
to punish malicious nodes. As a result, nodes that do not
cooperate are not demanded to forward packets and thus can
use the network as every normal user. Instead of encouraging
node to cooperate, this encourages them to be selfish and thus,
more than just disturbing the network, they also save energy
and are able to use network services.
Based on this initial work, several new algorithms have
been developed to enforce node cooperation. Most of them are
based on social or economics models, following the idea that
malicious behavior is not a technical node failure but rather
a consequence of user decision. Readers can refer to [2] for
an overview of ad hoc networking security. In the rest of this
section, we point out some works of the two main categories:
economics models and reputation mechanisms.
B. Economics models
The idea of economics models is to reward cooperating
nodes with virtual currency. Nodes have to pay to send a
packet and forwarding nodes are rewarded since they consume
resources to resend other nodes’ packets.
The initial model was introduced by Levente Buttya´n and
Jean-Pierre Hubaux in [3]. This model uses a virtual currency
called nuglets and establishes a virtual trade market around
packet forwarding: nodes have to pay to send/receive packets,
and nodes that forward other nodes’ packets earn some nuglets.
Nodes are thus forced to cooperate in the packet forwarding
process to be able to send their own packets. In the model
called packet purse model (PPM), a node that wants to send
a packet has to load it with nuglets to pay its transport. Then,
each forwarding node uses some nuglets of the packet to pay
itself before forwarding it. If a packet has not enough nuglets
to reach the destination, it is discarded.
This model encourages nodes to cooperate to earn nuglets.
Simulation of this model shows that it enforces nodes cooper-
ation: Their simulations show that nodes that cooperate reduce
their probability of running out of nuglets and thus increase
their probability to send their own packets. Each node that is
asked to forward a packet compute a payoff depending on its
current battery level and nuglets level and uses it to decide
if it forwards or not. Simulations show that it is possible to
choose a payoff function that encourages nodes to cooperate
and maintains the throughput of the network until nodes have
very little battery power remaining.
The drawback of this solution is the necessity to secure
the nuglets management: nodes are encouraged to cooperate
because they need nuglets and thus, the model must ensure that
they cannot forge or steal nuglets. To address this issue, [3]
proposes the use of a tamper resistant hardware module called
”security module”. This module is in charge of the nuglets
management: an encrypted header – the Packet Purse Header –
is added to the packets between the MAC Layer header and the
Network Layer header. Only security modules are allowed to
manipulate this new header ensuring safe nuglets management.
Although this model is efficient in encouraging nodes to
cooperate, it is limited by the need to deploy a new hardware
module using cryptographic functions in all the nodes, which
is costly and can be cumbersome.
In [4], a new model named Sprite, that avoids the use of a
hardware tamper-proof module, is introduced. The main dif-
ference between Sprite and the nugget module is the payment
control: to avoid the use of a specific module, Sprite uses a
central controller, the Credit Clearance Service (CCS) which
determines the credit and charge of each node of the system.
When a node forwards a message, it keeps a receipt of the
message and reports it to the CCS when a fast wire connection
is available. Although the Sprite system allows enforcing
node cooperation without any specific hardware module, it
is limited in its use of the CCS. A CCS induces centralized
architecture and assumes that each nodes has from time to
time access to a fast connection to communicate with the CCS.
Moreover, each node is supposed to have a certificate issued by
a scalable authority. To avoid packet tampering, each packet
is signed by the sender (using a public/private key scheme)
and each forwarding node has to verify the signature, leading
to extra overhead. The receipt-submission scheme is shown
to be cheat-proof using game theory. An important issue that
is not discussed in the paper is the fact that the sender pays
a posteriori. It means that the sender could send a message
even if it has not enough credits. As the Sprite model relies on
the use of the CCS and of public key infrastructure, one can
imagine that the CCS broadcasts the identity of nodes that are
out of credits and of nodes that regain credits. This will lead
to an extra overhead and to some latency in the information
transmission, as nodes are not always connected to the CCS.
As a result, some nodes may cheat for a long time before being
detected while others may not be able to send packets even
if they bought or earned enough credits to do so. Moreover,
as one receipt is generated per hop, a large number of extra
messages are generated (even if their are supposed to be sent
on fast connections). Thus, once again although this proposal
shows some effectiveness the cost incurred is quite heavy.
C. Reputation mechanisms
The other widely used approach in dealing with the problem
of misbehaving or selfish nodes is to use reputation mecha-
nisms. The general goal of reputation mechanisms is to detect
malicious nodes and to propagate their “bad boys” reputation
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to other nodes. Then, cooperative nodes can avoid forwarding
packets for selfish nodes. The idea is to “punish” selfish nodes
by preventing them to use network services. Some of these
mechanisms offer the possibility to re-socialize nodes when
they start to cooperate again (for example a node can refuse
to forward packets when it lacks battery power and restarts
its participation when it is plugged to a power supply). These
kinds of mechanisms are close to the watchdog approach since
they are based on monitoring.
One of the most well-known reputation mechanisms for
ad hoc networks is the CONFIDANT protocol [5]. It uses
first hand and second hand reputation information to detect
malicious nodes and isolate them. This is the closest work
to ours. Nodes deploys monitors that observe their neighbors
and detect any possible misbehavior. Like in the watchdog
approach, a path manager helps nodes to choose paths depend-
ing on the reputation of nodes in these paths. Moreover, two
other components, the trust manager and the reputation system
are added to manage reputation of nodes. The first one is in
charge of the alarm messages that are used by a node to signal
misbehaving nodes to its “friends”, to decide the validity of
such messages and to manage the list of friends. The former
is used to rate nodes depending on their behavior. In fact
this protocol starts with the watchdog approach and enriches
it with reputation information to avoid misbehaving nodes
in network functionalities. Simulations show a throughput of
good nodes equivalent to the one of a a well-behaving DSR
network even in the presence of one third of malicious nodes
in the population. The protocol assumes that nodes can be
identified (i.e. has a unique identity) and that it is possible to
manage groups of “friends” in an ad hoc network.
The difficulty when using these kinds of solutions is the
propagation of reputation [6] and the impact of false repu-
tation. In [7], authors propose to use Bayesian statistics for
exclusion of liars to improve the CONFIDANT protocol.
In the approach presented in CORE [8], it is not possible
to spread negative reputation between the nodes, thus, the
protocol avoids false reputation propagation classical problem.
It uses a sophisticated reputation function that integrates
observation of neighbors, positive reputation reported by other
nodes and functional reputation (for specific tasks). An inter-
esting point is that nodes can be reintegrated into the network
if they start to cooperate again after they have been detected
as misbehaving nodes.
All the approaches using reputation systems are interesting
and are shown either by simulation or by formal approach like
game theory to enforce node cooperation. Anyway they have
a cost and suffer spoofing attacks and collusion attacks.
III. LOCAL ALGORITHM
The algorithm we propose in this paper uses the same basic
idea as in the watchdog approach. The main weakness of this
approach is that it was not designed to punish misbehaving
nodes but only to avoid them. They are still able to use network
services. Moreover, as a side effect of the pathrather algorithm,
the malicious nodes save energy as they are no more asked to
participate to the network functionnalities.
Most of the solutions that have been proposed to address
this issue tend to increases the network performance but they
are quite heavy. Either they require a special-purpose hardware
module or a connection to a central authority in the case of
virtual currency mechanisms or they require spreading some
reputation over the whole network, creating more overhead. A
major problem using reputation algorithms is that it is difficult
to use second hand reputation information or to avoid false
reputation to be propagated (see for example [7], [9]).
In [10], authors demonstrate that CORE is not efficient and
argue that reputation mechanisms cannot be efficient because
they require information about neighborhood that are not
available in mobile environments, and that selfishness is not
a relevant problem. We discuss these arguments in section
V. In our opinion, the selfish nodes problem is a problem
of scroungers or network availability. If it is treated as a
security issue, most of the solutions are not sufficient since
they are not accurate (except solutions with hardware tamper-
proof modules): they are most of the time not robust enough
to counter spoofing attacks or collusion attacks. On the other
hand, if it is only considered as an unpleasant drawback when
users need the help of other users to communicate, proposed
solutions are probably too heavy. Thus, we propose in this
section a lightweight local algorithm that helps nodes avoid
waiting for help from non-cooperating nodes or helping non-
cooperating nodes. This solution is not an exact solution but
it is shown to increase the network efficiency (in the next
section) with negligible overhead.
A. Local solution
Solutions that do require neither hardware adaptations nor
central authority are reputation mechanisms. These mecha-
nisms build reputation management on top of monitoring
mechanisms. Thus, we propose to evaluate a local algorithm
that bases itself on of neighbors monitoring information to
make local decision of either forwarding a packet or not. The
main idea is to extend the initial watchdog mechanism that
increases the throughput of “good nodes” by adding some
features that decrease the bad node’s throughput.
B. Algorithm
Our proposed algorithm consists of two phases
1) The monitoring phase: is responsible for monitoring
neighbors and for deciding whether they are malicious or not.
Each node monitors its immediate neighbors only. For each
neighbor n, a node maintains a fault counter Fn. Each time a
node has to forward a data packet along a route using the DSR
routing algorithm, it starts a timer after having forwarded the
packet:
• if it overhears the neighbor, which must forward the
packet before its timer expires (as we are using the DSR
algorithm, we know which neighbor should forward the
packet) then nothing is done except canceling the timer,
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• else, if the timer expires before the packet has been
forwarded by its neighbor, the counter Fn, associated
with this neighbor, is incremented. If this counter reaches
a given threshold, the node blacklists the neighbor.
In the situation depicted in Figure 1, node 1 has an initial
route to node 4 which uses node 2 and 3. In this scenario,
node 3 is malicious and therefore, it has forwarded the route
request and route reply packet but will drop any data packet
it should forward. After forwarding a data packet from 1, 2
starts a timer and listen for 3 to forward it (keep in mind that
as we are using DSR, 2 knows that 3 is the next node in the
path). As 3 drops the packet, the timer will expire and, thus,
2 puts 3 in its blacklist.
1 2 3 4
5
Malicious node
Safe path
Initial path
Fig. 1. Illustration of malicious nodes avoiding
2) The punishment phase: is responsible for avoiding ma-
licious nodes and for reducing their throughput. This phase is
active when a node n has to forward a packet. There are two
cases here:
1) The packet is a route discovering packet (so either a
route request or a route reply). In that case, the node
will check all the nodes involved in this packet against
its blacklist. If any of the node included in the packet
(as source or part of the constructed route) has been
blacklisted earlier, n drops the packet. This action will
avoid constructing routes for malicious nodes and it
will prevent any route using a malicious node from
being constructed, and thus preventing malicious nodes
from being routed. Indeed, as malicious nodes declare
themselves in routes and drop data packets, we must
avoid creating route using them.
2) The packet is a data packet. Here, the node checks the
source of the packet against its blacklist. If the source
has been blacklisted before, the node discards the packet
in order to reduce the throughput of a malicious node.
In the above scenario, node 2 has blacklisted node 3. As
node 3 has dropped the data packet, the DSR algorithm will
trigger a route failure and thus, node 1 will try to find a new
path to node 4. When DSR route replies return to node 1, the
one forwarded by node 3 will be discarded by node 2 which
will forward only the one forwarded by node 5. Thus, a new
safe path from node 1 to node 4 has been constructed.
C. Blacklist management
The main challenge raised by our proposed algorithm is
establishing a blacklist. We propose, in this paper, three
versions of our algorithm to evaluate our understanding of the
notion of blacklist. The three versions are one with a global
blacklist, one with a pure local blacklist and one with a 1-hop
blacklist.
In the global blacklist version, when a node blacklists
another one, the entire network is aware of it. That is, when
a node checks if another one has been blacklisted, we assume
that it can know the decision of all the other nodes of the
network. Thus, if a node a has blacklisted a node b, a node c
which can be located anywhere in the network will know that
b is a blacklisted node. This algorithm is of course not usable
in a real ad hoc network context and is used here only for
evaluation purpose. Indeed, the global blacklist algorithm gives
the best results that our algorithm can achieve, as well as any
algorithm using local monitoring and reputation propagation.
In the local blacklist version, a node knows only its own
decision. It does not cooperate with others and thus, will not
be aware that a node a has blacklisted a node b, even if they
are its neighbors. This algorithm is the most efficient one in
term of overhead but, as we will see in the evaluation section,
is the less efficient because of the very small knowledge of
the nodes.
In the 1-hop blacklist version, a node will know its own
decision and the decision of its neighbors. That is, when
a node a blacklist a node b, it informs its neighbors of its
decision. This algorithm will have a small overhead because
information is kept extremely local. Indeed, using 1-hop infor-
mation has been used many times in other kind of algorithms
(routing algorithms, optimized flooding algorithms. . . ) and it
has always been considered (and evaluated) as acceptable in
term of overhead. As we will see in the evaluation section,
the results of this algorithm are very good, even if nodes are
moving.
Another issue has been left out in the description of the
algorithm. If the above algorithm is run as is, the nodes will
blacklist each other’s very fast. Indeed, if a node drops a
packet because it has decided that this packet was involving
a blacklisted node, it will certainly be blacklisted as well by
the preceding node. To avoid this, we introduce an announce
packet. A node, which wants to drop a packet, must send
another packet of the same size. By sending a packet with
the same size, the node shows that it has not dropped the
packet to save power, but it fills the packet with noise to
punish the malicious node. When a node receives this kind
of packet, claiming that it has just been blacklisted by one of
its neighbor, it blacklists the corresponding neighbor as well.
Using this simple rule, if a node claims falsely that others are
malicious, it will push itself out of the network.
IV. EVALUATION
A. General settings
In the experiments, we consider a network using standard
DSR algorithm without defense as reference, and the three
versions of our algorithm (global, local and 1-hop) presented
in the previous section. The networks are generated randomly
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and we introduce malicious nodes selected randomly. Like
in most of the related works [1], [3], [7], a malicious node
is a node that participates to the route discovery but always
drops data packets (Nodes that do not participate to the route
discovery decrease the network density but do not increase
the number of data packets dropped). In the simulations, we
vary the percentage of malicious nodes from 0% to 40%,
in order to compare our results to [1] (even if 40% of
malicious nodes may seem unrealistic). For each percentage of
malicious nodes, we run 5 experiments on different network
configurations. We use the same seed to generate the networks
for each percentage to avoid side effects in the comparisons
of results at the different percentages.
The density of networks is set to 16 (i.e. the nodes have an
average of 15 neighbors), thus, network have a high probability
to be connected to avoid side effects of isolated nodes and to
sometimes provide alternate paths around malicious nodes.
The simulation consists of several rounds. At each round,
10 pairs of connected nodes are selected in the network
and one node in a pair tries to send 40 data packets of
512 bytes to the other. We measure the throughput of the
non-malicious sending nodes (referred to as goodput) and
of the malicious sending nodes (referred to as badput). The
throughput of a node is the ratio of packets that have reached
the destination over how many were sent. Notice that the
detection of malicious nodes may introduce route defaults. As
the initial density is set in order to have a connected network,
we consider any route default as a failure: for each pair of
selected nodes, the sender has 40 packets to send. If it is
not able to find a route to the destination, the 40 packets are
considered as lost. If a route failure occurs after having send
a fraction of the 40 packets, another route is looked for, and if
no new route is found, the remaining packets are considered to
be lost. Note that this is a major difference with the pathrater
algorithm of [1], which tries to use the best possible route
even if it contains some malicious nodes.
The communication range is set to 100 meters and the size
of the area is set according to the desired density (i.e. average
number of neighbors, 15 here). The maximal transmission
rate is 11 Mbits/s and each node is supposed to process the
packets during a constant time of 5ms (since the packet size
is constant). We run our algorithm for two different types of
network: static, and with mobility. The mobility model used is
the random waypoint model. In this model, each node selects a
random point and then moves towards it at a random constant
speed. When it reaches it, the node selects a random stop
time and after this stop time is over, it restart the process of
selecting a waypoint and so on. We chose two mobility senarii:
• mean mobility: 5m/s and pause time randomly chosen
between 0s and 20s,
• high mobility: 20m/s and no pause time.
The second one is probably not realistic for spontaneous
networks created by people carrying portable objects, but it
may correspond to car speed and it is used to stress the
protocol and evaluate its limits.
In this set of experiments, we consider a perfect underlying
network and nodes that are either always misbehaving either
always cooperative thus, after a certain time, the malicious
nodes are all detected and the network does not evolve
anymore. For this reason, we only consider the initial phase.
In the next section, we present experiments in which nodes
can change their behavior.
B. Experiments on a 50 nodes static networks
We first use a 50 nodes which is the most common size used
in the evaluations of others models ([1], [5] for example). The
parameters are fixed as shown in Table I.
Parameter Level
Number of nodes 50
Density 16
Rounds 200
Range 100m
Area 313m × 313m
Pairs of nodes 10
Number of packets per connection 40
Packet size 512 bytes
Transmission rate 11Mbits/s
Process time per node 5ms
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR 50 NODES EXPERIMENTS.
In Figures 2 and 3, we observe that the throughput of the
nodes without using any defense algorithm is similar to the one
given by the other papers of the field ([1] for example). This
shows that the context of our experiments can be compared to
theirs.
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Fig. 2. 50 nodes, static network.
We first consider a static network. As stated in section III,
the results given by the algorithm using a global blacklist are
the best possible results we can have using our method: as the
blacklist is considered global and the propagation is considered
instantaneous, we will never be able to have more accurate
results using a totally local decision. This algorithm was of
course only evaluated to serve as reference.
As we can see Figure 2, without defense algorithm, the
throughput of the nodes of the network falls from about
100% to about 52% when 40% of the nodes are malicious.
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This shows the impact of malicious nodes over the network
performance. If we look at the global blacklist algorithm, we
can see that it achieves to keep the goodput very high, even
when a lot of nodes are malicious. This tends to show that
even a local decision can give very good results if everyone
is aware of this decision, which is the basic goal of reputation
systems. We must remark that these satisfying results are
possible because of the connectivity of the network and the
probability of the existence of several routes between two
nodes, the throughput falls with 40% of selfish nodes mostly
because of the lost of connectivity.
On the opposite, the local algorithm impact is not satisfying:
the average difference of throughput between malicious and
cooperative nodes is 14%, it cannot be considered as an
incentive for node cooperation.
The best algorithm in terms of results and overhead is the
1-hop algorithm. With 40% of selfish nodes, the throughput
of cooperative nodes falls to 79%, which is 13% less than the
referent global solution but still 27% more than the defenseless
solution. On the other side, the throughput of selfish nodes
falls bellow 60% which encourages nodes to cooperate. One
can notice that this badput is reached with only 20% of
selfish nodes whereas the throughput of cooperative nodes
is 95%. Thus, with 10 to 35% of selfish nodes, the average
difference between the throughput of cooperative and selfish
nodes is around 35%, and the throughput of cooperative nodes
is maintained over 85%. It appears from this experiments that
we reach a compromise with the 1-hop solution in terms of
efficiency and overhead.
C. Experiments on a 50 nodes mobile networks
Figure 3 shows the same experiments on networks where
nodes are mobile with both senarii: mean mobility and high
mobility. The throughput of the defenseless network is better
in the mobility case than in the static case. This can be
explained by the fact that nodes neighborhood is changing and
thus no node is enclosed in a malicious neighborhood for the
experiment duration. Anyway these experiments confirm the
static results in the following sense: in both cases, the average
difference between goodput and badput is around 47% which
can be considered as a good motivation for nodes to cooperate.
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Fig. 3. 50 nodes with mobility.
As conclusion of this subsection, we give a summary of the
benefits of the protocol in Figure 4. Depending on the mobility
senario, the gain in terms of goodput and the loss in terms of
badput vary, but the difference between gain of goodput and
loss of badput in a given senario is mostly equivalent, which
is the stability necessary to show the efficiency of our protocol
to enforce node cooperation.
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Fig. 4. Percentage of throughput gain of 1-hop algorithm compared to
defenseless solution (50 nodes).
V. DISCUSSION AND EXPERIMENT IMPROVEMENT
A. Discussion
We could naively conclude from the previous section that
the 1-hop algorithm is very efficient and is sufficient to obtain
a satisfying difference between the throughput of cooperative
and non cooperative nodes to encourage node to cooperate.
Nevertheless, when we consider 50 nodes uniformly dis-
tributed on a 313×313m square (to have a density of 16),
the mean route size in experiments is 2.69 hops (note that the
theoretical mean distance between two points randomly chosen
is approximated by 162,76m [11], but as we use distances in
hops, the average route size is a little bit longer). Using the
1-hop algorithm, after a short initial time, each node has the
complete information for the route of size lower or equal to 2,
so the impact of the use of a local protocol is not completely
demonstrated. We have chosen a 50 nodes network because
it is the network size used in most of the references we
mentioned, and it corresponds to a medium size meeting of
people, in a classroom or a workshop for example. To improve
our results and discuss the robustness of the protocol, we now
have to conduct experiments on larger networks.
B. Larger experiments
We now conduct the simulations in the same context as
previously except that we now simulate a 250 nodes network
(of density 16 like previously). Parameters are depicted in
Table II.
We first conduct experiments on a static network. The
results are depicted in Figure 5 and must be compared to
Figure 2. The first thing that we can notice is the reference
throughput of the defenseless network. Marti et al. announced
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Parameter Level
Number of nodes 250
Density 16
Rounds 200
Range 100m
Area 700m × 700m
Pairs of nodes 10
Number of packets per connection 40
Packet size 512 bytes
Transmission rate 11Mbits/s
Process time per node 5ms
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR 250 NODES EXPERIMENTS.
in [1] that if 10% to 40% of the nodes misbehave, then the
average throughput degrades by 16%-32%. They used a 50
nodes network and we obtain similar results. We can see on
Figure 5 that the throughput degrades by 33%-83%. As we
use a 250 nodes network, the mean route size is now 4,5
hops. Table III shows a comparison of routes in the 50 nodes
network and in the 250 nodes network: the probability to find
a selfish node in a route of the mean size (denoted by PSNR)
is very high in general and higher in the 250 nodes case. Most
important, the probability to use a 1-hop route is 30% in the
50 nodes network and only 6% in the 250 nodes network. This
factor is very important since malicious nodes have absolutely
no impact of the traffic on 1-hop routes. This means that 30%
of the traffic can be considered as safe and distorts the results.
50 nodes 250 nodes
Mean route size 2.69 4.5
PSNR with 20% of misbehaving nodes 0.45 0.63
PSNR with 30% of misbehaving nodes 0.61 0.8
PSNR with 40% of misbehaving nodes 0.75 0.9
1-hop routes 30% 6%
TABLE III
ROUTES COMPARISON FOR 50 AND 250 NODES NETWORKS.
Nevertheless, the experiments show once again the necessity
to use the 1-hop algorithm, which maintains the goodput over
70% until 30% of malicious nodes. When more malicious
nodes are introduced in the network, the goodput severely
degrades but the difference between goodput and badput
reaches 33% with 40% of malicious nodes. Moreover, the
use of the 1-hop algorithm increases the goodput by 39% in
average compared to the reference throughput of a defenseless
network. Thus, we can conclude that nodes are encouraged to
cooperate by the 1-hop algorithm even in worse conditions.
The impact of the mobility shown in Figure 6, consists
on a general deterioration of the goodput. Anyway, the 1-
hop algorithm maintains an average difference of about 27%
between goopdput and badput.
We conclude this subsection by Figure 7, which summarizes
the gain of throughput we obtain compared to the reference
defenseless network.
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C. Relevance of our model
We discuss in this subsection the relevance of our model.
We have shown on experiments that it creates a significant dif-
ference between cooperative nodes throughput and malicious
nodes throughput that may enforce nodes to cooperate. We
could strengthen the algorithm effect by for example dropping
the packets addressed to malicious nodes. This improvement
of the protocol could be easily implemented but would have
complicated the analysis of the results as even non-malicious
nodes would have seen their throughput decreased if they
wanted to send data to a misbehaving node.
The main issue with our algorithm is that it is based,
such as reputation mechanisms, on neighborhood monitoring.
In [10], authors argue that the monitors (like WatchDog)
require information about the neighborhood that they cannot
know (except in non-mobile environments), and that the rate
of false negative can easily become significant enough to
obliterate the network throughput. Moreover, they argue that
reputation systems only work under the assumption that nodes
identity cannot be falsified. Our algorithm suffers the same
limits: it is not resistant to spoofing attacks. We only argue
that we can obtain interesting results with less overhead and
less drawbacks that traditional reputation systems that are
conceptually sound but quite heavy compared to a simple local
solution. We can also detect false negative but, as we do not
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propagate reputation, the error is local to a node.
To illustrate how our protocol would react when the behav-
ior of the nodes can evolve, we conducted another experiment.
We run the above scenario in a situation where nodes can
be potentially malicious. A potentially misbehaving node is
a node that cycle between the malicious and non-malicious
states over time. This kind of scenario gives results on the
behavior of our proposed algorithm if we want nodes to be
able to be kind again, for instance if they notice that their
malicious behavior has been spotted.
Although the parameters and the scenario of the experiments
remains the same as those depicted in table II, two main
changes are done this new experiment. First, the malicious
nodes behave periodically as malicious and non-malicious.
They stay in malicious mode for 12 seconds and switch to
non-malicious for 48 seconds. A node’s full cycle is thus 60
seconds. The initial state and time in this cycle is selected
randomly so that not all the nodes are in the same state at the
same time. Second, to handle the changing behavior of the
nodes, a node that do not misbehave for 5 seconds is removed
from the blacklist.
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The results of this experiment is given Figure 8. In this
experiment, we measure the throughput of good nodes and
potentially malicious nodes while in their two possible state.
As we can see, the throughput of the malicious nodes when
they are behaving nicely is almost as good as the good nodes’
one while their throughput when they are misbehaving has
been reduced by the algorithm. This shows that our algorithm
is able to allow a node to change its mind if it sees that its
malicious behavior has been spotted.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a local algorithm that prevent
malicious user to behave in a selfish manner by pretending
that the node will participate and not doing so. We advocate
that the use of a local algorithm gives sufficient results to
solve this issue in civilian networks: it increases the network
throughput with minimum drawbacks. The algorithm has some
weaknesses, for example, it cannot detect nor punish malicious
nodes that change identity to flood the network. Anyway, the
other protocols suffer the same problem: they must rely on a
public key infrastructure or other mechanisms. In future work,
we plan to continue the evaluation of the protocol on larger
networks and to introduce some re-socialization mechanisms
to allow nodes that have been blacklisted be the neighbors to
start again to cooperate.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Issa Traore´ for his careful
review and his pertinent remarks.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating routing
misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks.” in MOBICOM, 2000, pp. 255–
265.
[2] P. Michiardi and R. Molva, Mobile Ad Hoc Networking. Wiley-IEEE
Press, 2004, ch. Ad Hoc Network Security, pp. 329–354.
[3] L. Buttya´n and J.-P. Hubaux, “Enforcing service availability in mobile
ad-hoc WANs,” in Proc. of the 1st ACM Interational Symposium on
Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc 2000). Boston,
Massachusetts: ACM, 2000, pp. 87–96.
[4] S. Zhong, J. Chen, and Y. R. Yang, “Sprite: A simple, cheat-proof, credit-
based system for mobile ad-hoc networks,” in Proc. of 22nd Annual
Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies
(INFOCOM 2003). San Francisco, CA, USA: IEEE, 2003.
[5] S. Buchegger and J.-Y. L. Boudec, “Performance analysis of the CON-
FIDANT protocol (Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc
neTworks,” in Proc of MobiHoc. ACM, 2002, pp. 226–236.
[6] Y. Liu and Y. R. Yang, “Reputation propagation and agreement in mobile
ad-hoc networks,” in Proc. Wireless Communications and Networking
(WCNC 2003), vol. 3. IEEE, 2003, pp. 1510–1515.
[7] S. Buchegger and J.-Y. L. Boudec, “The effect of rumor spreading in
reputation systems for mobile ad-hoc networks,” in Proc. of Modeling
and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt’03),
2003.
[8] P. Michiardi and R. Molva, “Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism
to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proc. of the
IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications
and Multimedia Security. Deventer, The Netherlands, The Netherlands:
Kluwer, B.V., 2002, pp. 107–121.
[9] J. Liu and V. Issarny, “Enhanced reputation mechanism for mobile ad
hoc networks,” in Proc. of Trust Management, Second International
Conference (iTrust 2004), ser. LNCS, C. D. Jensen, S. Poslad, and
T. Dimitrakos, Eds., vol. 2995. SPRINGER, 2004, pp. 48–62.
[10] R. Carruthers and I. Nikolaidis, “Certain limitations of reputation based
schemes in mobile environments,” in Proc. of the 8th ACM International
Symposium on Modeling, analysis and Simulation of Wireless and
Mobile systems (MSWiM ’05). Montre´al, Canada: ACM Press, 2005,
pp. 2–11.
[11] “http://mathworld.wolfram.com/squarelinepicking.html.”
8
